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CECL: The New Expected Credit Loss Standard a Big
Loss for Small Banks
I. INTRODUCTION
Famed science fiction writer Ray Bradbury once summed up his
personal writing style by stating that he was not “trying to predict the
future” but rather was “trying to prevent it.” 1 The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”) sets a similar goal with its newly released
Current Expected Credit Loss (“CECL”) accounting standards. 2 Under
CECL, FASB does not expect financial institutions to forecast the next
economic downturn, but instead aims to adequately prepare these entities
to prevent a major recession. 3
FASB is an independent, private sector, not-for-profit
organization that issues financial accounting and reporting standards for
companies and not-for-profit organizations which adhere to Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). 4 In 2016, FASB sent
shockwaves through the financial industry when it released a new
standard for calculating credit losses. 5 Credit losses are allowances that
a lender sets aside based on the amount of a loan that is unlikely to be
repaid. 6 These losses will appear on both a bank’s income statement and

1. Michael Walsh, To Prevent the Future, N.Y. POST (June 7, 2012),
https://nypost.com/2012/06/07/to-prevent-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/AV58-BLM2].
2. See Mark Zandi & Cris deRitis, CECL Will Strengthen, Not Hinder, Financial
BANKER
(Nov.
30,
2018,
9:25
AM),
System,
AM.
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-will-strengthen-not-hinder-financial-system
[https://perma.cc/JZB9-HQXW] (arguing that CECL is less procyclical than previous
accounting standards and will thus guard against a prolonged recession by being more
responsive to economic demands).
3. Id.
4. About
the
FASB,
FIN.
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BD.,
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495
[https://perma.cc/X494-T9FL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
5. Tom
Kimner,
What
is
CECL?,
SAS,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/cecl-are-us-banks-ready.html
[https://perma.cc/Y72Q-V4J3] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
6. Supervisory Policy and Guideline Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/alll.htm
[https://perma.cc/6D89LRD7] (last updated Nov. 20, 2019).
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balance sheet. 7 On an income statement, credit losses are listed as
expenses. 8 However, on a balance sheet, credit losses serve as a contraasset reducing the value of recorded loans. 9
Registering credit losses provides a more accurate picture of a
bank’s financial health because it shows how much loan revenue the bank
actually expects to receive. 10 It also gives the bank a backup source of
funds which can be drawn from if the loan defaults. 11 For example, if a
ten percent risk accompanies a $100,000 loan, then the lender would need
to allocate $10,000 for credit losses. 12 This $10,000 would be added to
the pool of credit loss loan reserves which can be drawn from if a loan
defaults. 13 The $10,000 would be deducted from the maximum $100,000
in accounts receivable on the balance sheet and the net amount of $90,000
would be recorded. 14 On an income statement, this $10,000 would
simply appear as an expense, limiting net profit. 15
Previously, FASB endorsed Financial Accounting Standard
(“FAS”)-5 and FAS-114 for calculating credit losses. 16 Both FAS-5 and
FAS-114 required institutions to account for these losses only when they
were “probable” to be incurred. 17 As a result, credit losses were only
noted when they were expected to be incurred within the next twelve to
7. Daniel
Liberto,
Allowance
for
Credit
Losses,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/allowance-for-credit-losses.asp
[https://perma.cc/MLW8-UCPF] (last updated Apr. 25, 2019).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See John R. Walter, Loan Loss Reserves, FED. RES. BANK OF RICH., ECON. REV.,
July/Aug.
1992,
20,
21
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_rev
iew/1991/pdf/er770402.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QJE-J88J] (“Displaying loans on a bank’s
balance sheet as the amount of funds lent without an adjustment for expected but uncertain
future losses would mislead the bank’s board of directors, creditors, regulators, and investors
by overstating the bank’s assets.”).
11. See Frequently Asked Questions on the New Accounting Standard on Financial
Instruments – Credit Losses, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/faq-new-accounting-standards-onfinancial-instruments-credit-losses.htm [https://perma.cc/R3SU-QQYJ] (last updated May
23, 2019) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions] (“In concept, an allowance will be created
upon the origination or acquisition of a financial asset measured at amortized cost. The
allowance will then be updated at subsequent reporting dates.”).
12. Walter, supra note 10, at 21.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Kimner, supra note 5.
17. See id. (“Under the previous incurred-loss model, banks recognized losses when they
had reached a probable threshold of loss.”).
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fifteen months. 18 One of the primary concerns with the FAS-5 and FAS114 models was that organizations could not record losses that were
forecasted but had not yet become sufficiently “probable.” 19 This issue
became especially apparent during the 2008 financial crisis when a high
number of borrowers defaulted and banks had not adequately built up
reserves. 20 At the same time, analysts used long-term data to devalue
institutions before they could note accounting losses. 21
In response to these concerns, FASB published its new CECL
standards in June 2016. 22 CECL requires accounting for all credit losses
expected over the entire life of the loan, not just when losses become
probable. 23 This means that for a thirty-year mortgage, accountants must
estimate expected future losses and set aside reserves for the entire loan
period, regardless of whether it is paid off in thirty years or in five. 24
Since fluctuations in loan loss reserves are a strong indicator of a bank’s
financial health, 25 one of the goals of CECL is to provide regulators with
a more accurate picture of a bank’s assets. 26 CECL should also
incentivize banks to become more risk-averse since they will need to

18. See id. (“Additionally, while current rules require an allowance for credit losses only
expected to incur over the next 12 months, CECL removes the probable loss threshold and
requires a lifetime credit loss allowance to be established on day one of each exposure.”).
19. See
Credit
Losses,
FIN.
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BD.,
https://www.fasb.org/creditlosses&pf=true [https://perma.cc/QPA4-JLBV] (last visited Jan.
24, 2020) (“This model has been criticized for restricting an organization’s ability to record
credit losses that are expected, but do not yet meet the ‘probable’ threshold.”).
20. See id. (arguing that the global financial crisis highlighted the problems with the
previous credit loss standards).
21. See id. (“In the lead-up to the financial crisis, financial statement users were making
estimates of expected credit losses using forward-looking information and devaluing financial
institutions before accounting losses were recognized. This highlighted that the information
needs of users differ from what GAAP requires.”).
22. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11.
23. Kimner, supra note 5.
24. See Mary Ellen Biery, CECL Forecasting: How Far Into the Future is Far Enough,
ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alll-insiders/cecl-far-enough/ [https://perma.cc/M92D-2RTR]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (stating that part of the challenge for banks is calculating how long
a loan will last).
25. Walter, supra note 10, at 21 (stating that calculating loan loss reserves prevents
examiners from being misled by apparent bank assets that are unlikely to be realized).
26. See Dr. Dan Geller, New CECL Model, “Defaults Dynamics,” Makes Banks Too
Smart to Fail, According to Dr. Dan Geller of Analyticom, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/new-cecl-model-defaults-dynamics-makesbanks-too-smart-to-fail-according-to-dr-dan-geller-of-analyticom-2018-10-16
[https://perma.cc/GN3B-77FB] (“CECL is more than just an allowance calculation – it is an
early warning system.”).
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account for more default risk upfront rather than later on. 27 Ultimately,
CECL aims to better equip financial institutions to prevent severe
recessions by increasing reserves and better aligning credit losses with
expected future income. 28
CECL applies to all banks, savings associations, credit unions,
and financial institution holding companies that follow GAAP. 29 Public
businesses that are SEC filers were the first institutions required to
implement this method, starting in the fiscal year beginning after
December 15, 2019. 30 Public business entities that are non-SEC filers
must be in compliance after December 15, 2022. 31 Finally, the SEC
stated that small reporting companies, as well as non-SEC public and
private companies, will also have until the fiscal year beginning after
December 15, 2022 to implement the new standard. 32
Specifically, CECL requires that expected losses be calculated
using “relevant information about past events, including historical credit
loss experience on financial assets with similar risk characteristics,
current conditions, and reasonable and supportable forecasts that affect
the collectability of the remaining cash flows over the contractual term of
the financial assets.” 33 Many banks experienced trouble interpreting this
guideline, especially regarding what constitutes “reasonable and
supportable.” 34 What is clear, however, is that the challenge associated
with generating this data for banks will be considerable. 35
27. See Sheila Blair, Congress Should Stay Out of New Bank Rules on Loan Losses, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/f699d7e0-ad28-11e9-b3e2-4fdf846f48f5
[https://perma.cc/3HKR-8KLN] (“[I]t should make bankers a little more cautious in their
lending decisions, as they will have to account for likely losses when the loan is made, not
kick the can down the road until the borrower is actually in arrears.”).
28. Zandi & deRitis, supra note 2 (arguing that CECL will incentivize banks to increase
reserves during periods of growth to more adequately prepare for downfalls).
29. See Accounting Standards Updates – Effective Dates, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137102
[https://perma.cc/V8AG-YDZC] (last visited Jan. 18, 2020) (“Public business entities that
meet the definition of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filer, excluding entities
eligible to be smaller reporting companies as defined by the SEC, for fiscal years beginning
after December 15, 2019, including interim periods within those fiscal years. All other entities
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2022, including interim periods within those
fiscal years.”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11.
34. Id.
35. See Banking: Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL), ABRIGO (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45339.html
[https://perma.cc/GUR9-DCC5]
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This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II explores why CECL will
have a major impact on the banking industry as a whole. 36 Specifically,
Part II focuses on the significant increase in loan loss reserves expected
as a result of CECL and the challenges presented in generating data to
support this expected income. 37 Part III explains why bigger banks are
far better equipped to invest in CECL and handle these difficult data
requirements compared to smaller banks. 38 Part IV suggests steps that
can be taken to alleviate this disproportionate impact on smaller banks. 39
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion, summarizing the argument as a
whole. 40
II. CECL WILL BE A DRAMATIC SHIFT FOR ALL BANKS
A.

Most Banks Will Have to Greatly Increase Loan Loss Reserve
Allocations

One of the most notable effects of CECL will be its impact on
bank loan loss reserve allocations. 41 When credit losses are estimated,
banks are required to set aside funds as loan loss reserves. 42 These
reserves balance out revenue lost from loan defaults, late payments, and
renegotiations. 43 When a loss occurs, banks can use the reserve funds to
cover the loss instead of reducing income at the time of the loss. 44 Many
[hereinafter Banking: CECL] (“Adopting CECL may require upgrading existing hardware and
software or paying higher fees to third-party vendors for such services.”).
36. See infra Part II.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See infra Part V.
41. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“Perhaps more important to the bottom line is the more
recent publication of revolutionary changes to accounting standards that determine the
appropriate level of balance sheet reserves for credit losses.”).
42. See Walter, supra note 10, at 20 (“The federal banking regulators … require that all
banks include in their financial statements an account named allowance for loan losses ….
The account absorbs loan losses both from loans the bank can currently identify as bad loans
and from some apparently good loans that will later prove to be uncollectible.”).
43. See Julia Kagan, Loan Loss Provision, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loanlossprovision.asp
[https://perma.cc/88NLDYSK] (“This provision is used to cover a number of factors associated with potential loan
losses, including bad loans, customer defaults, and renegotiated terms of a loan that incur
lower than previously estimated payments.”).
44. Adam
Barone,
Bank
Reserve,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bank-reserve.asp [https://perma.cc/U53B-2Q7C] (last
updated Jan. 29, 2020).
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investors look to bank reserve increases as a problematic sign for banks. 45
This is because when banks increase reserves, it often signals that they
are engaged in more risky ventures or that some of their loans have
already defaulted. 46
However, banks generally want to minimize the amount of funds
they have tied up in reserves. 47 The more a bank increases its reserves,
the less liquidity it has to lend and generate profits. 48 The “primary
business of banking” is to use depositors’ funds in order to lend money
and collect interest. 49 Therefore, although loan loss reserve requirements
are an important safeguard, they also directly undermine a bank’s efforts
to maximize income. 50
CECL now requires banks to account for all expected losses
during the life of a loan instead of just when losses become probable. 51
Since the risk is generally estimated over a longer period of time, the
amount of revenue that could be lost will likely increase. 52 For example,
a newly issued twenty-year fixed-rate mortgage may only have a minimal
likelihood of loss from expected revenue over the first few years. 53 This
is because many borrowers have a certain amount of funds set aside to
repay initial payments and have a strong sense of their immediate

45. See Nicola M. White, Citi, Chase Break For Big Boost in Loan Loss Reserves,
BLOOMBERG TAX (May 30, 2019, 10:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financialaccounting/citi-chase-brace-for-big-boost-in-loan-loss-reserves
[https://perma.cc/K9BTGKP3] (stating that changes in loan loss reserves are a problematic signal for investors).
46. See id. (“Investors care about changes in loan loss reserves because when a bank
shores up its reserves, it signals that trouble is brewing.”).
47. See Barone, supra note 44 (“[B]anks normally minimize their excess reserves and
lend out the money to clients rather than holding it in their vaults.”).
48. See id. (“Banks usually have little incentive to maintain excess reserves because cash
earns no return and can even lose value over time due to inflation.”).
49. Walter, supra note 10, at 20.
50. Barone, supra note 44.
51. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“[T]he calculation of the expected credit loss is now
computed over the life of the loan.”).
52. Emilio Lopez & Dr. Janet Zhao, CECL Quantification: Commercial & Industrial
(C&I)
Portfolios,
MOODY’S
ANALYTICS
(Mar.
2017),
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/webinars-on-demand/2017/cecl-quantificationcommercial-industrial-portfolios [https://perma.cc/TL3C-TJHT] (“62% of banks surveyed by
Moody’s Analytics expect CECL compliance to increase their overall provisions.”).
53. See Joseph Breeden, Dear Congress: Don’t Toss CECL Out, Work with FASB to
Amend
It,
AM.
BANKER
(July
2,
2019,
9:00
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dear-congress-dont-toss-cecl-out-work-with-fasbto-amend-it [https://perma.cc/HUP2-68X9] (“With IFRS 9, over 80% of a loan portfolio is
allocated at a “single year” reserve amount, which is far different from that of CECL for a 30year mortgage.”).
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economic outlook when they decide to borrow. 54 Over the course of the
twenty-year period, the probability of late payments or default increases
substantially. 55
This can be attributed to the larger role that
macroeconomic trends begin to play during a longer timeframe. 56
Many top officials from the largest U.S. banks have issued
statements supporting the notion that reserves will increase. 57 Marianne
Lake, Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) for JP Morgan, predicted that
CECL would cause her organization to increase its reserves by $5 billion,
a thirty-five percent increase. 58 Similarly, Bank of America’s CFO, Paul
Donofrio, stated that his company forecasted a twenty percent increase in
reserves as a result of CECL, amounting to an extra $2 billion. 59 Other
major institutions that issued statements regarding the impact of the new
accounting standard include Citigroup, which stated that its reserves
would increase by twenty to thirty percent, and Discover, which said that
it would raise reserves by fifty-five to sixty-five percent. 60
Since FASB has delayed CECL implementation for small
institutions until late 2022, the majority of smaller, regional banks have
declined to issue public forecasts on the expected impact of CECL. 61
However, Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc., a Nashville bank with roughly
54. See id. (arguing that short term mortgage risk is far less than risk over an extended
period).
55. Lee E. Ohanian, Who Defaults on Their Mortgage, and Why? Policy Implications for
Reducing Mortgage Default, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2017/who-defaults-on-their-mortgage-and-whypolicy-implications-for-reducing-mortgage-default [https://perma.cc/M3N5-Q5BN] (arguing
that economic and individual factors can have a strong impact on the ability to repay
mortgages over time).
56. See id. (stating that changes in the ability to pay are the primary reason for mortgage
default).
57. See Brian Riley, CECL Impact to Chase: 35% Increase Raises Loss Reserves by $5
J.
(Apr.
15,
2019),
Billion,
Mostly
Credit
Cards,
PAYMENTS
https://www.paymentsjournal.com/cecl-impact-to-chase-35-increase-raises-loss-reservesby-5-billion-mostly-credit-cards/ [https://perma.cc/N8ZR-9MJV] (“JP Morgan Chase chief
financial officer Marianne Lake said the financial institution expects to have to increase
reserves by about $5 billion, or about 35 percent, on day one of its implementation of the
current expected credit loss standard, or CECL.”); see also White, supra note 45 (stating that
other institutions acknowledged that their reserves will go up but did not want to comment
until closer to the implementation date).
58. Riley, supra note 57.
59. Zach Fox, Bank of America Estimates $2B Reserves Build Due to CECL, S&P
GLOBAL (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/UuORqonZp0bNFiI21hVtMg2 [https://perma.cc/JUN4-PZRA].
60. White, supra note 45.
61. See id. (“Nearly all mid-size and smaller financial institutions are still mum about the
looming impact of what is considered the biggest change to bank accounting in decades.”).
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$25 billion in assets, stated that its loan loss reserve increase would likely
be somewhere between twenty and sixty percent. 62 Even if adjusted
gradually over the next few years, these reserve increases represent
another substantial cost for smaller entities that already face challenges
as a result of increased compliance expenses. 63
Because CECL typically raises the calculated allowance for
consumer loans but decreases it for commercial loans, some institutions
are actually predicting a reduction in their loan loss reserves.64 Wells
Fargo, for instance, expects its loan loss reserve allocations to be reduced
by up to one billion dollars as a result of CECL. 65 The reason for this
difference is that commercial loans tend to extend for shorter time periods and
carry less risk than consumer loans.66 Wells Fargo’s portfolio has a much
larger percentage of commercial loans than other top financial institutions.67
Wells Fargo’s situation illustrates why banks may rebalance their loan
portfolios away from consumer loans as a result of CECL.68 With a lower loan
loss reserve burden, commercial loans could effectively stretch the liquidity of
banks by allowing them to issue more loans overall.69 Alternatively, if banks
want to continue issuing the same amount of consumer loans, the burden of
CECL compliance could be shifted to the consumer.70 Because the loan loss
reserve requirements tend to make consumer loans less profitable for banks,
borrowers may be forced to pay higher interest rates or settle for shorter
62. Id.
63. See Blaine Luetkemeyer, CECL Spells Trouble for Small Banks, Consumers, AM.

BANKER (Mar. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-spellstrouble-for-small-banks-consumers [https://perma.cc/UUZ6-HLXT] [hereinafter CECL
Spells Trouble] (stating that CECL will be “unduly burdensome” on small banks).
64. See Kiah L. Haslett, Wells Fargo Feels ‘Quite Prepared’ for CECL, S&P GLOBAL
(Oct.
12,
2018),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/nticf6dmy0l4zm2ittb-ta2 [https://perma.cc/L9AM-DNPC] (“The standard
‘tends to increase’ the calculated allowance for consumer loans and ‘tends to decrease’ the calculated
allowance for commercial loans.”).
65. Carolyn Duren, Wells Fargo Estimates CECL Will Reduce Reserves up to $1B, S&P
GLOBAL (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/lK3usZayO0ScerPRvkrOHA2 [https://perma.cc/38NU-A2JP].
66. See Haslett, supra note 64 (stating that shorter term commercial loans result in lower
default risk than longer term commercial loans).
67. Duren, supra note 65.
68. Haslett, supra note 64 (purporting that CECL could impact loan terms and pricing).
69. Richard D. Hitt et al., CECL Implementation Expected to Propel Loan Portfolio Sales
in Q4 2019, ANKURA (Aug. 29, 2019), https://ankura.com/insights/cecl-implementationexpected-to-propel-loan-portfolio-sales-in-q4-2019/
[https://perma.cc/BR4Y-9J4H]
(“Modifying the loan mix through portfolio loan sales is an effective way to manage loan
reserves and the potential negative impacts caused by CECL.”).
70. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“CECL will drive up costs and those costs
will either be passed along to consumers or force institutions to curtail lending.”).
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repayment periods in order to rectify the difference.71 Finally, CECL may
greatly deter banks from issuing riskier loans in the first place because of the
impact on loan loss reserves.72 Regardless of whether a bank increases its loan
loss reserves or is one of the few that can reduce loan loss reserves like Wells
Fargo, changes in loan loss reserve allocations as a result of CECL will impact
the business of banking moving forward.73
B.

The CECL Data Requirement Generates an Unprecedented
Need for Information

CECL will require a substantial adjustment to the means by
which many institutions calculate future losses. 74 Due to the extended
life of the loan requirement, organizations must now estimate risk for far
longer than they ever had to before. 75 As a result, new factors will need
to be considered in order to generate the reliable data required by FASB. 76
In particular, macro-level information will become more impactful on
loss calculations than it has been in the past. 77 For example, under the
previous incurred model, systemic risk in the housing market was
unlikely to make a large impact on default probability due to the shortterm nature of the evaluation. 78 Now, however, banks must provide
adequate weight to the probability of another financial housing crisis or

71. See Joshua Ronen, A New Accounting Rule on Loan Losses Could be Disastrous for
(Apr.
22,
2019,
8:16
AM),
the
Economy,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-new-accounting-rule-on-loan-losses-could-bedisastrous-for-the-economy-2019-04-22 [https://perma.cc/5C5C-FLE6] (“The American
Bankers Association …warned against some of the injurious effects of CECL: increased
volatility of regulatory capital, the necessity of increased capital at all times, higher interest
rates for borrowers and favoring shorter term loans over longer term ones including residential
mortgages and student loans.”).
72. See Large Banks Push for a CECL Extension, ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alllregulations/fasb-cecl/large-banks-push-cecl-extension/ [https://perma.cc/KE69-MNX5] (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (arguing that “CECL may have a disproportionate impact on longerterm assets of high risks” and could thus reduce loan availability).
73. See Duren, supra note 65 (stating that Wells Fargo’s reserves will experience a
significant decrease while competitors will have to build up reserves).
74. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11.
75. Id.
76. See id. (“[I]nputs to allowance estimation methods will need to change to properly
implement CECL.”).
77. See Kimner, supra note 5 (“[M]acro-level data and risk factors will need to be
analyzed to assess the impact of various scenarios on credit losses.”).
78. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11 (stating that CECL is more forwardlooking and recognizes losses even before they have defaulted).
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other such systemic risk when generating expected future credit losses on
mortgages. 79
Adding to the complication, relevant factors for one bank may be
wholly irrelevant for another depending on the size and composition of
its portfolio. 80 The CECL guidelines are “intentionally non-prescriptive”
so that institutions may customize them to fit their unique portfolios. 81
One of the key problems is that missing even a small piece of information
can have significant implications for the whole calculation. 82 In a 2019
article for Accounting Today, Mary Ellen Biery wrote that “[c]ore
conversions, incomplete data fields, missing data fields, and a lack of
historical losses in a loan segment or in an institution’s portfolio can
cause problems with running a particular CECL model or being able to
produce a meaningful result with a particular CECL methodology.” 83
CECL’s ambiguity has become a huge cause of concern for banks. 84
Due to initial uncertainty with CECL data requirements, banks may
greatly adjust the means by which they calculate expected future losses, even
after implementation.85 This will likely lead to volatility in reserve allocations
and seemingly undermines FASB’s goal of increasing balance sheet
transparency.86 The challenge presented in estimating new data sources could

79. See id. (stating that “historical loss information” will be a key component of the new
CECL calculation).
80. See Mary Ellen Biery, JP Morgan Gives First Look at CECL Impact, ACCT. TODAY
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/jpmorgan-chase-gives-firstlook-at-cecl-impact [https://perma.cc/3QS2-TKAR] [hereinafter First Look] (arguing that
CECL impact will be “highly variable” from institution to institution due to its varying
influence on different types of loans).
81. Preparing for CECL Data Requirements, ABRIGO (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.alll.com/resource-center/cecl-data-requirements/
[https://perma.cc/6B68SFST].
82. See id. (“Put simply, if an institution does not have the right data in an accessible
format, scenarios and parallels can’t be performed.”).
83. Mary Ellen Biery, The Data Dilemma: Do Financial Institutions Have Enough Data
for
CECL?,
ACCT.
TODAY
(June
19,
2019,
8:30
AM),
https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-data-dilemma-do-financial-institutions-haveenough-data-for-cecl [https://perma.cc/27MV-B37A] [hereinafter The Data Dilemma].
84. See id. (“[O]nly 43 percent of respondents expressed confidence that the data they
have will be sufficient for CECL.”).
85. See Brice Luetkemeyer, Bankthink CECL: A Solution in Search of a Problem, AM.
BANKER (July 29, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-a-solution-insearch-of-a-problem [https://perma.cc/CC89-D8FN] [hereinafter A Solution in Search of a
Problem] (“By requiring banks to account for the expected lifetime losses of a loan at the time
of origination, there will eventually be shorter maturities on loans. This will result in more
economic volatility, placing swings on the back of the consumer.”).
86. See id. (arguing that CECL will create volatility in loan loss reserve allocations).
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further exacerbate this issue.87 One of the problems encountered by financial
analysts in 2008 was determining the long-term risk of the newly popularized
subprime securities.88 Under CECL, banks seeking to estimate data points that
have yet to be tested will face the same problem.89
In order to become CECL-compliant, many banks have turned to
third-party vendors. 90 A recent survey by Abrigo indicates that most
bankers believe their institutions will turn to outside sources in order to
implement this new model. 91 In that survey, thirty-seven percent of
bankers said they would use the models developed by a third-party, while
another thirty-three percent said they would rely on the third-party
entirely. 92 Only fifteen percent of respondents stated that they would rely
solely on their own resources in order to implement CECL. 93 While
vendors are certainly a useful source for generating necessary data, this
added cost has become a significant challenge to many banks’ profit
margins. 94 Effectively, the use of a third-party shifts the issue from being
a data problem to a financial problem. 95

87. See The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (stating that CECL creates a variety of data
challenges in generating reliable data).
88. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the SubprimeMortgage Financial Crisis, DE ECONOMIST 157, NO. 2, 2009 129, 132
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10645-009-9110-0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF2W-EVP7] (“The IMF itself has suggested that, for at least some of these
securities, market prices may be significantly below the expected present values of future cash
flow and therefore, that market values may not provide the right signals “for making longterm value-maximizing decisions.”).
89. See The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (stating that estimating loan-level data presents
a new challenge to institutions).
90. Most Bankers to Use 3rd-Party Vendors, ABRIGO, https://www.alll.com/alllregulations/fasb-cecl/cecl-survey-most-bankers-to-use-3rd-party-vendors-advisors-for-cecl/
[https://perma.cc/J4FB-SX9D] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) [hereinafter 3rd-Party Vendors].
91. See id. (“A majority of bankers expect their financial institutions to use third-party
vendors or a combination of advisors and third-party vendors to help them implement the
current expected credit loss model, or CECL, according to an informal poll released by Abrigo
and MST.”).
92. See id. (“Thirty-seven percent of those polled said they plan to use models developed
through advisory services and third-party vendors/products, and 33 percent said they plan to
use an external product alone. In other words, more than two-thirds of those polled will rely
on external models rather than internally prepared models.”).
93. See id. (“Only 15 percent plan to rely solely on their own resources.”).
94. See Raj Gnanarajah, CONG. RES. SERV., R45339, BANKING: CURRENT EXPECTED
CREDIT LOSS (CECL) at 9 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45339.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSK2-99V3] (highlighting that banks will need to invest in third-party
vendors as part of CECL implementation).
95. See id. (arguing that even though third-party vendors are useful for gathering
information, they still represent a significant cost to institutions).
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In sum, CECL represents far more than just a shift in the way that
banks estimate credit losses. 96 The new standard and the challenges
associated with meeting its daunting requirements necessitate a
fundamental alteration in how banks assess expected future risk. 97 As a
result, many banks will be forced to take on a greater financial burden by
investing in third-party vendors. 98 The success that each institution has
in developing an accurate forecast for future risk will undoubtedly play a
major role in the implementation of CECL and the overall economic
health of that institution. 99
III. SMALLER BANKS WILL BE DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMED BY CECL
When asked about CECL in April 2019, JP Morgan’s CEO, Jamie
Dimon, testified before the House Financial Services Committee that
“[f]or JP Morgan, I don’t have concerns” but added that “I do think you
should be looking at what [CECL] will do to smaller banks.” 100 Dimon
went on to state that in a time of economic crisis, “[small banks] will
virtually have to stop lending.” 101 Dimon’s comments stem from recent
studies indicating that, had CECL been in place during the 2008 financial
crisis, banks would have had a much harder time issuing loans due to
CECL’s high loan loss reserve requirements. 102
Dimon’s statements should serve as a strong warning to FASB
that CECL will not affect all banks equally. 103 In particular, CECL will

96. See First Look, supra note 80 (arguing that CECL will result in major loan loss
reserve adjustments, consequently changing the industry).
97. See id. (stating that CECL will result in big changes in both small and large
institutions).
98. Gnanaraiah, supra note 94.
99. The Data Dilemma, supra note 83 (“Whether a financial institution has enough or the
right kind of data for estimating the allowance for credit losses under CECL will really be
determined on an institution-specific basis,’ said Paula King, Abrigo senior advisor and a
former bank CFO and co-founder.”).
100. Neil Haggerty, Guns, CECL and ‘Too Big To Manage’: Big-Bank CEO’s on Hill,
AM. BANKER (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/guns-cecland-too-big-to-manage-big-bank-ceos-on-hill [https://perma.cc/SF45-2XWP].
101. Id.
102. The Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) Standard Will Make the Next Recession
Worse, BANK POL’Y. INST. (July 16, 2018), https://bpi.com/analysis-demonstrates-that-thecurrent-expected-credit-loss-cecl-accounting-standard-would-be-procyclical-if-used-forregulatory-capital-purposes/ [https://perma.cc/Z24X-C7T4] [hereinafter BANK POL’Y. INST.].
103. Haggerty, supra note 100 (stating that small banks will be more adversely impacted
than larger institutions).
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adversely impact small banks in two main ways. 104 First, CECL
represents both a significant upfront and continuing investment that
smaller banks may not be in a position to make. 105 Second, research
indicates that under CECL, a recession will hinder the ability of smaller
banks to make loans more drastically than it will for larger banks. 106
A.

Large Banks Are Far More Equipped to Invest in the Cost of
CECL Implementation

JP Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo each
have assets of over $1.89 trillion. 107 In comparison, some community
banks may only have $20 million dollars in assets. 108 Even still, each of
these vastly different entities will have to invest in the new CECL
model. 109 While the largest banks will certainly have to develop a more
robust and thus more expensive model, smaller banks will likely feel a
deeper impact. 110 This is because, among other reasons, larger banks
have more methods of raising capital from investors and frequently have
higher profit margins. 111
FASB acknowledged the challenge CECL poses in developing
systems and generating data, and responded by granting implementation
extensions to some institutions. 112 Small reporting companies and credit

104. See id. (stating that CECL will be especially harmful to smaller banks); see also
CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“CECL will drive up costs and those costs will either
be passed along to consumers or force institutions to curtail lending.”).
105. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that, for smaller banks, CECL will
present “onerous operational challenges.”).
106. Haggerty, supra note 100.
107. Alicia Phaneuf, Here is a List of the Largest Banks in the United States by Assets,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/largest-banks-us-list
[https://perma.cc/2UGV-CFGF].
108. Rebecca Harrington, How to Start Your Own Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2016),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-to-start-your-own-ban_n_497261
[https://perma.cc/5ZBK-B7K3].
109. Kimner, supra note 5.
110. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that smaller banks will not create
benefits but will present major challenges).
111. How do Banks Raise Capital?, RAISE CAP., https://www.raise-capital.com/how-dobanks-raise-capital/ [https://perma.cc/V4AF-7EDQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (stating that
banks raise capital in numerous ways, such as direct investment and underwriting).
112. FASB Seeks Public Comment on Proposal to Delay Effective Dates for Private and
Certain Public Companies and Organizations, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176173179331
[https://perma.cc/N6ML-J4RR].
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unions will now have until January 1, 2023 to implement CECL. 113
Although this delay will give smaller entities more time to invest and
collect data, they will still need to eventually become CECL-compliant
and generate much more information than ever before. 114
When examining the financial impact of CECL, it is also critical
to take into account the rising cybersecurity and compliance expenses. 115
No other industry loses more money as a result of cyberattacks than the
financial industry. 116 In 2017, banks lost a whopping $16.8 billion to
cybercriminals. 117 As a result, banks have invested heavily in
preventative measures to avoid cybercrimes. 118 JP Morgan spends about
$600 million per year on cyber protection. 119 According to a 2019
Deloitte survey, the average cybersecurity cost per worker was $2300. 120

113. FASB Issues Proposal to Delay CECL Implementation for Some Institutions, AM.
BANKING J. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/08/fasb-issues-proposalto-delay-cecl-implementation-for-some-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/46J8-TBRQ] (“[T]he
Financial Accounting Standards Board today voted to propose a delay for the implementation
of the current expected credit loss standard until January 2023 for certain companies. The
delay would apply to small reporting companies (as defined by the SEC), non-SEC public
companies and private companies.”).
114. See FASB to Delay CECL Implementation for Some Institutions, AM. BANKING J.
(July 17, 2019), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/07/fasb-to-delay-cecl-implementationfor-some-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/BB6C-UNLP] (“‘FASB’s vote to delay CECL for
certain smaller banks offers further proof that the required efforts to implement this costly
standard are far greater than the board has previously led bankers to believe,’ said American
Bankers Association President and CEO Rob Nichols after the vote.”).
115. See Kathryn R. Edge, Bank on It: Predictions from the Bank Lady, 52 TENN. B. J. 29,
32 (2016) (“The cost of protecting the banking system, when coupled with the cost of
compliance and CECL, makes margins so tight that many community bankers wonder if they
can afford to stay in business.”).
116. Bhakti Mirchandani, Laughing All The Way to the Bank: Cybercriminals Targeting
(Aug.
28,
2018,
1:57
AM),
U.S.
Financial
Institutions,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bhaktimirchandani/2018/08/28/laughing-all-the-way-to-thebank-cybercriminals-targeting-us-financial-institutions/#4053a7246e90
[https://perma.cc/4Q7E-9ELQ].
117. Id.
118. See id. (“Given the value that breaches destroy, financial institutions are bolstering
cybersecurity as executives seek to mitigate the risk of cyberattack.”).
119. Bruce Sussman, JP Morgan Chase Cybersecurity: “We Spend Nearly $600M Per
Year,”
SECURE
WORLD
EXPO
(July
9,
2019,
8:30
AM),
https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/jpmorgan-chase-cybersecurity-budget
[https://perma.cc/3PL2-MRSA].
120. Yalman Onaran, Cybersecurity Costing Large Financial Firms $3,000 Per
Employee:
Survey,
INS.
J.
(May
2,
2019),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/05/02/525296.htm
[https://perma.cc/LXK5-DVSM].
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This investment eats directly into profit margins and reduces bank
capital. 121
Compliance is also an increasing burden, especially in the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis. 122 Since that time period, compliance costs
have increased by over sixty percent for retail and corporate banks. 123
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act has cost banks an estimated $36 billion
since its passage. 124 For banks with less than $100 million in assets,
compliance costs account for an average of 8.7% of their non-interest
expenses per year. 125 Banks in the one to ten billion dollar range spent
2.9% of their annual non-interest expenses on compliance regulation. 126
CECL represents yet another cost hurting the profitability of
banks. 127 As previously mentioned, CECL is likely to increase the loan
loss reserve requirements for most banks. 128 In particular, banks with a
large percentage of consumer loans in their portfolio will be impacted the
most. 129 This reserve increase removes the amount of available funds
from banks to drive profit. 130 Additionally, CECL compliance will
require a significant investment for banks to conduct internal analysis or
engage a third-party and pay the vendor to calculate loan loss reserves. 131
More data than ever will be required to evaluate default probability for
121. See Barone, supra note 44 (stating that banks attempt to minimize vault cash
whenever possible in order to seek profits).
122. See Dilip Krishna, Regulatory Productivity: Is There an Answer to Rising Cost of
Compliance, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/regulatory/articles/cost-ofcompliance-regulatory-productivity.html [https://perma.cc/R9JS-QK6B] (last visited Jan. 21,
2020) (“Compared to pre-financial crisis spending levels, operating costs spent on compliance
have increased by over 60 percent for retail and corporate banks.”).
123. Id.
124. Elena Mesropyan, How Banks Can Effectively Manage Regulatory Changes, MEDICI
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://gomedici.com/how-banks-can-effectively-manage-regulatorychanges [https://perma.cc/V83R-4DYR].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that CECL will represent a
significant cost to banks).
128. Riley, supra note 57.
129. See Haslett, supra note 64 (stating that consumer loans “tend to increase” under
CECL while commercial loans “tend to decrease.”).
130. See Bryan R. Smith, Banks Queasy about Data, Guidance as Loan Loss Change
Arrives,
BLOOMBERG
TAX
(Dec.
19,
2019,
4:45
AM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accounting/banks-queasy-about-data-guidance-asloan-loss-change-arrives [https://perma.cc/5N25-XURA] (“[L]oan losses … could lower their
earnings if they have to beef up the reserves they set aside to cover credit losses in quarterly
reports.”).
131. See A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85 (“[T]he cost of each employee’s
time to compile information, manage third-party vendors, data feeds and modeling will be
significant.”).
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the life of each loan. 132 Viewed as a whole, CECL compliance costs
combined with the already substantial cybersecurity and compliance
burdens will likely be a problem for smaller banks. 133
B.

Under CECL, Small Banks Will Have a Harder Time
Responding to a Recession than Larger Banks

As indicated in early studies, one of the main critiques of CECL
is that it might fall short of its goal of being countercyclical. 134 Under
this system, CECL would increase loan loss reserves in strong economic
times when banks issue more loans and decrease reserves in more
turbulent periods when banks are encouraged to be risk averse. 135
However, findings show that CECL actually has the opposite effect and
is more likely to be procyclical. 136 This means that it is highly correlated
with the economy and market risk. 137
A study conducted by the Bank Policy Institute found that if
CECL had been in effect during the 2008 financial crisis, the recession
would have had an even more profound impact and would have lasted
longer. 138 This finding was based on the idea that banks were unlikely to
have built up adequate reserves prior to the collapse. 139 As a result, once
defaults started to increase, CECL would have made it tougher to lend. 140
A similar belief fueled American Bankers Association Senior Vice
President (“SVP”) Mike Gullette’s suggestion that CECL could “prevent
banks from lending at exactly the moment the nation would want them
132. See Smith, supra note 130 (“But while many banks have old records on hand, they
may lack historical data covering highs and lows in an economic cycle, given how long ago
the last recessions occurred.”).
133. See Edge, supra note 115, at 32 (arguing that CECL costs should be viewed in
conjunction with other compliance obligations).
134. See Tony Hughes, CECL is in Trouble But There’s a Fix, AM. BANKER (Jan. 11, 2019,
10:01 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cecl-is-in-trouble-but-theres-a-fix
[https://perma.cc/79V4-2QDD] (“CECL was implemented primarily to force banks to
maintain countercyclical reserves.”).
135. See id. (“For true countercyclicality, proportional allowances need to be high when
lending growth is high and low when growth is low or falling.”).
136. See id. (“All thorough analyses of the effect of the new rules have shown, to differing
degrees, that allowances will continue to be procyclical after CECL comes into force during
2020.”).
137. See id. (arguing that CECL is more procyclical and will build up reserves more
dramatically in times of recession).
138. BANK. POL’Y. INST., supra note 102.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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lending to help the economy rise out of an economic slump.” 141 Although
more focused on small banks, this is the same problem that Dimon
seemed to suggest. 142 Gullette took his statements even further by
entirely rejecting the notion that CECL will help prevent another
recession and asserting that “CECL could actually make any new crisis
even worse because of its procyclicality.” 143
The fear alluded to by Gullette and Dimon is that if banks find
themselves in a recession without significant loan loss reserves, bailing
themselves out could be far more difficult than in the past. 144 As
projections indicate, CECL will likely increase loan loss reserve
requirements, and a recession greatly increases default probability. 145
When these two factors combine, banks will have diminished capital to
make loans and will issue fewer as a result. 146 This could lead to
increased rates and more burden placed on the borrower. 147 Even worse,
fewer loan opportunities could stagnate economic recovery and lead to a
prolonged recession. 148
Although this critical issue has the potential to harm banks of all
sizes, CECL will particularly harm smaller banks. 149 The fallout of the
2008 crisis demonstrates that small banks are less likely to benefit from
recession-based stimulus programs. 150 Under CECL, small banks will

141. Michael L. Gullette, New Accounting Standards Are Not a Big Improvement, FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/bce02fce-ba9b-11e9-96bd8e884d3ea203 [https://perma.cc/4FWX-KNA7].
142. Haggerty, supra note 100.
143. Gullette, supra note 141.
144. See id. (arguing that CECL would have made the past recession worse by making it
more difficult to lend); see also Haggerty, supra note 100 (arguing that smaller banks would
“virtually have to stop lending” during a recession).
145. Lopez & Zhao, supra note 52.
146. See Barone, supra note 44 (stating that when reserves increase banks have less assets
to invest).
147. See A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85 (highlighting that the many
costs associated with CECL will be passed from the lenders to the consumers).
148. See Gullette, supra note 141 (purporting that CECL would have made the past
recession worse by making it more difficult to lend); see also Haggerty, supra note 100
(arguing that smaller banks would “virtually have to stop lending” during a recession).
149. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that CECL will cause significant
harm to small banks and consumers).
150. Laura Layden, Banks Fell in the Great Recession, but They’re Stronger Now, USA
(March
14,
2018,
5:00
AM),
TODAY
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/03/14/banks-fell-great-recession-but-theyrestronger-now/394354002/ [https://perma.cc/K8SU-ZKSK] (“About 85% of banks that failed
in the U.S. from 2008 to 2011 were smaller ones with assets of less than $1 billion.”).
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struggle even more than under past standards. 151 This is because during
a recession the default probability increases, and banks will need to
increase loan loss reserves. 152 As loan loss reserve requirements increase,
more money will be tied up by issuing the same loans. 153 Small banks
will struggle far more than large banks to meet these rising capital
demands because they do not carry the same advantages as larger
institutions. 154
IV. REFORM SUGGESTIONS
Before introducing CECL reform suggestions, it is necessary to
first establish who has the power to implement change. Since FASB is a
private, not-for-profit organization, Congress does not have the power to
influence FASB directly in the way it does other institutions. 155 The SEC
has been delegated the authority to dictate accounting standards for the
private sector. 156 In turn, it delegates this authority to FASB. 157 Due to
this delegation structure, the following recommendations are divided
accordingly into: (1) suggestions for FASB, and (2) suggestions for
Congress.
A.

FASB Should Provide More Structured Guidelines to Calculate
Future Risk

Issuing more specific rules for applying CECL will help small
banks reduce both their cost burden and procyclicality. 158 In developing
CECL, FASB sought to provide more flexibility to banks to give them
151. See Gullette, supra note 141 (arguing that CECL could make it more difficult to lend
during a recession).
152. Barone, supra note 44.
153. See id. (stating that the higher banks reserves, the less money for investment).
154. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (arguing that smaller banks will be
disproportionately harmed in times of recession).
155. See Banking: Current Expected Credit Loss, EVERYCRSREPORT,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45339.html#ifn14 [https://perma.cc/7J6W-MJQP]
(last visited Jan. 20, 2020) [hereinafter EVERYCRSREPORT] (“Congress has delegated
authority to the bank regulators and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
address credit loss reserves.”).
156. See id. (“Currently, the SEC recognizes the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) as the designated forganization for establishing GAAP for the private sector.”); 15
U.S.C.S. § 77s (2019).
157. Id.
158. See Smith, supra note 130 (arguing that CECL’s ambiguity creates a huge challenge
for banks).
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the freedom to calculate the potential risks on their own. 159 FASB’s only
significant guideline was “reasonable and supportable data” to back up
these risk assessments. 160 However, the tremendous uncertainty as to
what qualifies as “reasonable and supportable” has led many banks to
potentially waste time and financial resources with excess information. 161
One of the primary reasons that CECL costs are so high is that the
information is highly variable from institution to institution. 162 While it
is true that each bank portfolio is different, FASB should issue more
structured guidance as to how each type of loan or security should be
quantified regarding risk. 163 It should also answer key questions, such as
the way in which long-term data should be estimated for new products. 164
A more streamlined approach would aid in driving down the cost of thirdparty vendors since these vendors would not be tailoring their services to
individual banks to the same extent. 165
Another major benefit of more structured guidance is increased
reliability of reported credit losses. 166 Under the current rules, two banks
with a similar portfolio could account for their default probability in
dramatically different ways. 167 This discrepancy creates a major risk, not
only for the banks themselves, but also for investors who use loan loss
reserves as a means to assess bank health. 168 One of the chief purposes
of CECL is to improve the alignment of assets and credit losses. 169 The
issuance of more concrete standards will directly aid this goal. 170
159. See id. (“FASB has offered examples and a few pieces of guidance on how to make
the calculation without issuing hard-and-fast rules on how to comply with the new
accounting.”).
160. Banking: CECL, supra note 35.
161. See Smith, supra note 130 (“Any time an accounting standard calls for judgment,
companies and auditors need to back up their reasoning. This puts pressure on finding reliable
data from numerous sources and forecasts that banks can use to make what’s considered one
of the most sensitive estimates on their balance sheets.”).
162. A Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 85.
163. See Smith, supra note 130 (arguing that one of the main challenges with CECL is
“applying an accounting standard that’s big on principles and scant on specifics”).
164. See id. (stating that methods for calculating long-term risk could encompass
numerous factors).
165. Gnanaraiah, supra note 94.
166. Banking: CECL, supra note 35.
167. See First Look, supra note 80 (“The impact of CECL could also vary significantly
based on each institution’s current or forecasted view of the economic environment.”).
168. See White, supra note 45 (“Investors care about changes in loan loss reserves because
when a bank shores up its reserves, it signals that trouble is brewing.”).
169. Zandi & deRitis, supra note 2 (stating that CECL will help banks account for long
term risk and not just that which has been incurred).
170. Smith, supra note 130.
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As loan loss reserve volatility decreases, it will also help to
mitigate the procyclical fears surrounding CECL. 171 Each of the studies
that suggested CECL could exacerbate a recession focused on the initial
premise that banks were not adequately capitalized in the first place. 172
If structured rules were installed, all banks would follow the same basic
system. 173 Therefore, any changes to CECL would be more easily
implemented across all banks, and systemic risk would be lessened. 174
This differs from the current CECL model, where one bank could do an
excellent job forecasting credit losses but still suffer increasing default
probability simply because other banks were not as successful. 175
Ultimately, this more unified banking structure would be more responsive
to market fluctuations and thus better positioned to increase reserves
ahead of economic downturns. 176
B.

Congress Should Provide Financial Incentives to Small Banks

Now is finally the time for Congress to stop ignoring smaller
banks. The costs of compliance, cybersecurity, and CECL have created a
huge financial barrier to growing a bank. 177 Each requirement carries
very important motives. 178 However, Congress should not lose sight of
the fact that banks are businesses at their core and rely liquidity to
generate profit. 179 They also must acknowledge the dramatic size
differences among banks and begin treating small community banks
differently than major entities like JP Morgan and Bank of America. 180
Under our current CECL model, bank consolidations and fewer new
banks will result in a greater concentration of power in a smaller number

171. See Hughes, supra note 134 (stating that CECL will likely be procyclical and highly
reactive to adverse changes in the economy).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Kimner, supra note 5.
176. Id.
177. See Edge, supra note 115, at 32 (arguing that the addition of CECL costs to existing
compliance burdens represents a major challenge to banks).
178. See id. (stating that many of the compliance and security costs are aimed at preventing
future harm and correcting mistakes of past recessions).
179. See Walter, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that collecting deposits and making loans
are the “primary business of banking”).
180. Phaneuf, supra note 107.
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of entities, which could diminish the number of community banks
responsive to local needs. 181
One possible way of minimizing the impact of CECL is to
provide tax write-offs to smaller banks for offsetting the cost of CECL
data collection. 182 Money allocated to future losses is not usually tax
deductible until the debt has been charged off. 183 However, a minor
alteration could allow banks to increase capital by attaining early benefits
for expected future losses. 184 Specifically, Congress could tailor these tax
benefits to banks under a certain asset size in order to help level the
playing field. 185 CECL serves an important role in making banks more
responsive to financial hardship. 186 A tax allowance created by the
government could prevent future bailouts and be viewed as money saved
down the line. 187 This type of incentive could be an extremely impactful
benefit for smaller banks struggling to turn a profit or risking forced
consolidation. 188
Another possible incentive would be to put CECL aside and
simply provide tax benefits to new or small banks. 189 Aiding the
institutions that are disproportionately harmed by the rising compliance,
cybersecurity, and CECL costs will help to rectify the primary issue. 190
One possible plan would be to offer tax benefits to small banks providing
loans in certain designated “opportunity zones.” 191 Similar programs
181. CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“By requiring financial institutions to account
for the expected lifetime losses of a loan at the time of origination, CECL threatens to
eliminate some lending services . . . .”).
182. See Keith Foster, Yes, CECL Affects Taxes Too, BKD (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.bkd.com/article/2017/12/yes-cecl-affects-taxes-too
[https://perma.cc/X8BHPLJB] (“In general, an allowance for bad debts isn’t deductible for tax purposes. The
deduction is delayed until there’s a charge off. This means when CECL increases a GAAP
allowance, it will increase expense and reduce capital without resulting in a corresponding
tax deduction.”).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (stating that banks are responsive to community
needs and CECL impacts will extend to conumsers).
187. Foster, supra note 182.
188. See
Tom
Kimner,
CECL:
Are
U.S.
Banks
Ready?,
SAS,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/cecl-are-us-banks-ready.html
[https://perma.cc/DH5M-3FF6] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (“Perhaps more important to the
bottom line is the more recent publication of revolutionary changes to accounting standards
that determine the appropriate level of balance sheet reserves for credit losses.”).
189. Foster, supra note 182.
190. Id.
191. See Andy Peters, Banks Explore Ways to Capitalize on Tax Law’s ‘Opportunity
Zones,’ AM. BANKER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-
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exist and serve to incentivize investing in locations facing economic
hardship. 192 This plan would be unique in that smaller banks, rather than
all institutions, would receive this benefit. 193 It would allow smaller
banks to continue the important role of serving local communities while
still investing in CECL. 194 Preventing the closing of small banks also
helps to maintain a more diversified banking system. 195
V. CONCLUSION
The new CECL accounting standards will dramatically alter the
means by which expected credit losses are calculated. 196 Banks will
likely increase loan loss reserves and bank portfolios could shift as a
result. 197 This change also represents an enormous data challenge, and
many banks have been forced to turn to third-party vendors for
assistance. 198 These changes will weigh far more heavily on smaller
banks than on larger institutions. 199 Large financial institutions are in a
better position to invest in the new CECL model than smaller banks. 200
Furthermore, increased reserves are more likely to hurt small banks in
times of recession. 201 In order to alleviate data concerns, FASB should
first look to provide more structured guidelines so that CECL
implementation can become more efficient and cost-effective. 202 The
legislature should also explore incentives such as tax write-offs to assist

explore-ways-to-capitalize-on-tax-laws-opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/G66Q-DSHR]
(“These zones provide a way for private investors to receive tax benefits in exchange for
investing in low- and moderate-income communities.”).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Jonathan Jacobs, CECL Standard Expected to Make a Major Impact, ACCT.
TODAY (November 12, 2019, 2:18 PM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/ceclstandard-expected-to-make-a-major-impact
[https://perma.cc/HC2T-9N3U]
(“CECL
represents a significant change from prior GAAP, which is still used by most entities.”).
197. See Lopez & Zhao, supra note 52 (arguing that most banks expect CECL to increase
loan loss reserves).
198. 3rd-Party Vendors, supra note 90.
199. See CECL Spells Trouble, supra note 63 (“For smaller institutions … it will present
onerous operational challenges.”).
200. Id.
201. See Gullette, supra note 141 (arguing that community banks do not have the same
ability to cope with a recession as larger institutions).
202. See Smith, supra note 130 (arguing that one of the main challenges with CECL is
“applying an accounting standard that’s big on principles and scant on specifics”).
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smaller banks. 203 In conclusion, FASB’s effort to straighten out credit
loss recognition with CECL poses an extreme risk to the future of many
small banks. 204
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